Instant Attraction: Immediate Action-Effect Bindings Occur for Both, Stimulus- and Goal-Driven Actions by Markus Janczyk et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 25 October 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00446
Instant attraction: immediate action-effect bindings occur
for both, stimulus- and goal-driven actions
Markus Janczyk*, Alexander Heinemann and Roland Pfister
Department of Psychology III, University ofWürzburg, Röntgenring,Würzburg, Germany
Edited by:
Hannes Ruge, Technische Universität
Dresden, Germany
Reviewed by:
Bernhard Hommel, Leiden University,
Netherlands
Peter Dixon, University of Alberta,
Canada
*Correspondence:
Markus Janczyk, Department of
Psychology III, University of
Würzburg, Röntgenring 11, 97070
Würzburg, Germany.
e-mail: markus.janczyk@
uni-wuerzburg.de
Flexible behavior is only possible if contingencies between own actions and following
environmental effects are acquired as quickly as possible; and recent findings indeed point
toward an immediate formation of action-effect bindings already after a single coupling of
an action and its effect. The present study explored whether these short-term bindings
occur for both, stimulus- and goal-driven actions (“forced-choice actions” vs. “free-choice
actions”). Two experiments confirmed that immediate action-effect bindings are formed
for both types of actions and affect upcoming behavior. These findings support the view
that action-effect binding is a ubiquitous phenomenon which occurs for any type of action.
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INTRODUCTION
Human behavior other than unconditioned reflexes is character-
ized by enormous flexibility. In many situations, humans decide
what to do and when to act to achieve their current goals. Such
behavior has been investigated thoroughly by researchers of vari-
ous disciplines and it has been distinguished on several grounds.
For the present purpose, we focus on one specific distinction, i.e.,
that of stimulus- vs. goal-driven actions, and relate it to the central
aspect of the present study: the question of whether or not simi-
lar action-effect associations are formed for these different kinds
of actions. Here we focus explicitly on short-term associations of
actions and effects, and our results suggest that short-term associ-
ations are formed for both kinds of actions (see also Herwig and
Waszak, 2012, for similar conclusions with a different approach).
STIMULUS- AND GOAL-DRIVEN ACTIONS
In the following, we will distinguish actions by their more or less
apparent cause. On the one hand, behavior can be exhibited as
a response to environmental demands, such as when hitting the
brake pedal upon the perception of a red traffic light. On the other
hand, humans often act simply when they decide to do so, i.e., they
exhibit instrumental behavior to pursue a self-determined goal.
Importantly, this behavior may even be initiated in the absence
of any explicit external stimulus demanding for it. Throughout
this paper, we refer to these types of actions as “stimulus-” vs.
“goal-driven,” respectively1.
1These types of behavior have, among others, been termed “stimulus-based” or
“externally triggered” vs. “intention-based” or “self-initiated,” respectively (e.g.,
Waszak et al., 2005; Herwig et al., 2007; Brass and Haggard, 2008; Passingham et al.,
2010). However, if people show a particular behavior in response to a given stimu-
lus (i.e., “stimulus-based”), the relevant association between stimulus and behavior
has to be established beforehand. This, in turn requires intention as well. Exner
(1879; cited in Hommel, 2000) described this kind of behavior as the “prepared
reflex.” Thus, stimulus-based actions clearly require intentions as well, at least when
This distinction highlights the criterion that determines
whether an action was executed correctly or not: on the one hand
it is the stimulus prompting a specific action; on the other hand
it is the goal whose pursuit requires an instrumental action. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that this dichotomy rarely applies to
realistic behavior. Rather, both aspects usually play a role in any
given action – yet to a varying degree (see also Passingham et al.,
2010). Hence, the dominant aspect must be used to pigeonhole
the respective action.
In the laboratory, stimulus-driven actions are typically investi-
gated with forced-choice tasks (Berlyne, 1957): a stimulus appears
and entirely determines the appropriate response. Berlyne con-
trasted this task with free-choice tasks, where a stimulus simply
prompts to choose between one of several possible response alter-
natives. These two types of tasks have been employed widely to
investigate stimulus- and goal-driven actions (e.g., Waszak et al.,
2005; Keller et al., 2006; Herwig et al., 2007; Pfister et al., 2010,
2011; Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011), and the present experiments
also draw on these methods.
THE ROLE OF ACTION-EFFECTS IN ACTION CONTROL
Numerous studies across the last years targeted the role of action-
effects in action planning and/or execution. The term of action-
effects encompasses any contingent sensory changes that are pro-
duced by the action. Regarding the conceptual distinction into
stimulus- and goal-driven actions, the role of such action-effects
was (and still is) subject to discussion (Herwig et al., 2007; Her-
wig and Waszak, 2009; Pfister et al., 2010, 2011; Herwig and
Horstmann, 2011; Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). The theoretical
background of this debate is mostly related to ideomotor theory –
a general framework of human action control that we summarize
setting up the association between stimulus and response. We therefore use the labels
stimulus- vs. goal-driven throughout this article.
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in the following (Herbart, 1825; Harleß, 1861; James, 1890/1981;
Hommel et al., 2001; for historical papers and reviews, see Stock
and Stock, 2004; Shin et al., 2010; Pfister and Janczyk, 2012).
In a nutshell, ideomotor theory assumes that (1) actions
are represented by their contingent sensory consequences, i.e.,
action-effects, and that (2) an action is selected and initi-
ated by mentally anticipating these sensory consequences. These
assumptions imply that there are stable and bidirectional asso-
ciations of actions and their effects. For goal-driven actions,
such long-term associations between actions and their contin-
gent effects were demonstrated numerous times in the literature
(e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Hommel et al., 2003; Rieger,
2004; Hoffmann et al., 2009). The respective experiments typi-
cally employed two distinct experimental phases. In the acqui-
sition phase, participants performed freely chosen actions that
were followed by contingent action-effects. For example, par-
ticipants pressed one of two response keys at their choice and
each key press reliably produced a low- or high-pitch tone effect
(e.g., left key→ low tone, right key→ high tone). In the sub-
sequent test phase, these tones were then presented as stim-
uli to probe the assumed action-effect association. For exam-
ple, in forced-choice test phases, participants react to the effects
either in an acquisition-compatible (i.e., low tone→ left key, high
tone→ right key) or in the reversed mapping (i.e.,high tone→ left
key, low tone→ right key). Such studies consistently found reac-
tion times (RTs) to be faster in the acquisition-compatible map-
ping than in the reversed mapping (the “non-reversal advantage”),
and these results clearly indicate that action-effect associations
were built up for the freely chosen actions in the acquisition
phase.
As noted above, most studies in this design employed free-
choice actions in the acquisition phase (but see Elsner and Hom-
mel, 2004). A systematic comparison of both, free- and forced-
choice actions was reported by Herwig et al. (2007). In this study,
participants learned action-effect associations for either free- or
forced-choice actions. A subsequent forced-choice test phase then
probed for resulting action-effect associations. With a free-choice
acquisition phase, they replicated the non-reversal advantage of
previous studies (e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2001). In contrast, for
the forced-choice acquisition phase, this effect was absent (and in
some conditions even numerically reversed). This finding was later
shown not to depend on attentional factors (Herwig and Waszak,
2009) and to occur also for eye-movements as response modality
(Herwig and Horstmann, 2011).
These findings were taken to suggest that action-effect associa-
tions are not built up for stimulus-driven actions. This conclusion,
however, is at odds with several findings related to ideomotor the-
ory. For instance, slight variations of the design of acquisition and
test phase yielded reliable signs for action-effect learning in forced-
choice tasks (Hommel, 1996; Elsner and Hommel, 2004; Pfister
et al., 2011), already after very few pairings of actions and effects
(Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). Furthermore (arbitrary) action-
effects were shown to have a pronounced impact in a huge variety
of entirely forced-choice tasks (e.g., Hommel, 1993; Ziessler, 1998;
Kunde, 2001, 2003; Koch and Kunde, 2002; Rieger, 2007; Janczyk
et al., 2009, 2012a; Hubbard et al., 2011).
THE PRESENT APPROACH: SHORT-TERM ACTION-EFFECT
ASSOCIATIONS
In sum, the evidence whether or not associations of actions and
their effects are acquired for stimulus-driven actions is somewhat
mixed, yet with a trend toward a positive answer. So far, however,
we have only dealt with long-term associations. On a shorter time-
scale, features of a particular action (e.g., stimulus, response, and
effect) are assumed to be bound into an event-file (Hommel, 1998;
Hommel et al., 2001). Although there is evidence that such short-
term associations are not necessarily the same as, or a precondition
for long-term associations (Colzato et al., 2006), it is still impor-
tant to know whether a putative difference between stimulus- and
goal-driven actions is present in the short-term domain.
In the first study on such short-term action-effect associations,
Dutzi and Hommel (2009) reasoned that a sufficiently co-activated
(free-choice) response and its contingent effect should be inte-
grated readily into an event-file (Hommel, 1998; Hommel et al.,
2001). Encountering the effect again after a short period of time
should thus prime the associated response (Hommel, 2007). This
response-repetition bias was indeed found in four experiments.
Thus, action-effects seem to be bound into event-files instanta-
neously (Dutzi and Hommel, 2009; see also Pfister et al., 2012,
for the integration of effects that have been associated with a
response on a long-term time scale). Additional evidence from a
different paradigm suggests that stimuli occurring after a forced-
choice response are similarly bound to the responses (Hommel,
2005, Experiment 2). As there are no direct comparisons in
this context, it is unclear whether short-term associations occur
similarly for both types of actions. To this end we (1) repli-
cate earlier findings for free-choice responses (Dutzi and Hom-
mel, 2009) and (2) show similar associations for forced-choice
actions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants performed a task in which each trial consisted of two
stages. A first response produced one of two auditory action-effects
in a non-predictable manner. Importantly, this response was either
a free-choice action (Experiment 1a, replicating the paradigm of
Dutzi and Hommel, 2009) or a forced-choice action (Experiment
1b). Shortly thereafter, the same or the other tone was presented,
prompting a free-choice response. For the free-choice actions of
Experiment 1a, we expected to replicate the response-repetition
bias when the effect tone was repeated. If the same binding mech-
anism operates for forced-choice actions, a similar bias should
be observed in Experiment 1b. In contrast, this bias should be
absent if action-effect binding does not take place under these
circumstances.
METHOD
Participants
Seventeen participants performed in Experiment 1a (mean
age= 27.8 years, 12 female), and another 16 participants per-
formed in Experiment 1b (mean age= 21.6 years, 13 females).
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of
Würzburg and were naïve regarding the hypotheses underlying
this experiment.
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Apparatus and stimuli
Visual stimuli were presented in white against a black background.
The imperative stimulus in the first stage of each trial was a string
of 13 centrally presented asterisks in Experiment 1a (see Dutzi and
Hommel, 2009) and a small white square presented below and to
the left or right of a fixation cross in Experiment 1b (see Her-
wig et al., 2007; Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). Tones were 50 ms
sinusoidal tones of either 300 or 900 Hz presented via headphones.
Responses were given via the left and right control key of a standard
computer keyboard using the index-finger of the left or right hand.
Procedure
The trial procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. In Experiment
1a, each trial began with the presentation of the asterisks for
300 ms (Stimulus 1). Participants were to freely choose from both
responses at leisure (Response 1). This key press triggered one of
the two tones at random (Effect). After 1000 ms, either a second
tone occurred (Stimulus 2; go trials) or not (no-go trials). In go
trials, the second tone was either the previous effect tone or the
alternative tone. Participants were then to freely choose one of the
response keys within a time window of 1500 ms. Following late
responses or responses in no-go trials, visual error feedback was
provided for 1000 ms, and the next trial started after an inter-trial
interval (ITI) of 3000 ms. The trial procedure of Experiment 1b
was identical except for the presentation of Stimulus 1. Here, each
trial started with a fixation cross for 500 ms. Then, Stimulus 1
was presented to the left or right of fixation (300 ms) prompting
a speeded response with the corresponding key. Wrong responses
to Stimulus 1 prompted an error feedback (1000 ms) and the trial
was canceled afterward. For correct responses, the trial continued
just as in Experiment 1a.
Participants completed three experimental blocks with 64 tri-
als each. Of these trials, 16 trials were no-go trials. In 24 trials the
effect tone was repeated as Stimulus 2 (congruent go trials), and
in the remaining 24 trials the other tone was played as Stimulus 2
(incongruent go trials). Ten practice trials were completed prior to
the experimental blocks. Participants were tested individually in a
single session of about 20 min, and they received written instruc-
tions prior to the experiment. For free-choices, participants were
instructed to decide on the response as spontaneously as possible
and not to pursue any specific strategies. Furthermore, they were
encouraged to produce both response alternatives about equally
often throughout the experiment.
RESULTS
The main dependent variable was the proportion of go trials with
response-repetitions (repetition rate; see Figure 2, left panel)2. For
Experiment 1a, we excluded go trials with late responses (0.9%)
and for Experiment 1b we excluded trials with wrong responses
to Stimulus 1 (1.0%) and go trials with late responses (0.8%). We
then compared the repetition rates for congruent and incongruent
go trials with separate one-tailed t -tests. Erroneous responses in
no-go trials were given in 3.9 and 2.1% of the trials in the free-
and forced-choice task, respectively.
For Experiment 1a (free-choice), we excluded two participants
from the analysis because they had chosen only a single key as
Response 1 in 91.6 and 99.5% of the trials, respectively. The
remaining 15 participants chose both keys about equally often
for Response 1 [48.8 vs. 51.2%, χ2(1)= 1.61, p= 0.205].
The results are visualized in Figure 2 (left panel). Crucially, the
repetition rate was significantly higher in congruent as compared
to incongruent trials, t (14)= 2.58, p= 0.011, d = 0.94. The same
results emerged for Experiment 1b (forced-choice), t (15)= 3.29,
p= 0.002, d = 1.16.
To test for differences between free- and forced-choice actions,
we performed an additional between experiment analysis by means
2One could in principle also analyze RTs as the dependent variable. However, it is
rather difficult to interpret any pattern that might emerge from such an analysis,
rendering RTs an inappropriate measure in this context, as has been argued in detail
by Dutzi and Hommel, 2009, Footnote 1). Exploratory analyses of the present data
yielded no systematic pattern across both experiments. Descriptive RTs to Stimulus
2 are summarized in the Appendix.
FIGURE 1 |Trial structure for Experiments 1a and 1b, where the
task (free-choice vs. forced-choice) was manipulated
between-subjects. Each trial consisted of two stages: first, a free- or
forced-choice response randomly produced one of two possible effect
tones. Then, a second tone appeared and prompted the participants to
choose a second response; this tone was either the previous effect
tone or the alternative tone. In 25% of the trials, no tone appeared as
Stimulus 2, indicating a no-go trial. Experiment 2 employed the same
trial structure but the task (free- vs. forced-choice as Response 1) was
now varied within-subjects.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean response-repetition rates as a function of task
(free-choice vs. forced-choice) and relation of Effect and Stimulus 2
(congruent vs. incongruent). A repetition bias for congruent trials emerged
consistently for both tasks in both experiments. Error bars are within-subjects
standard errors, calculated separately for each comparison of congruent and
incongruent trials (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
of a 2× 2 ANOVA with trial-type (congruent vs. incongruent) as
a within-subjects factor and experiment (1a vs. 1b) as a between-
subjects factor. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of
trial-type, F(1, 29)= 15.82, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.35, confirming the
higher repetition rate for congruent as compared to incongru-
ent trials. Secondly, a significant main effect of experiment, F(1,
29)= 6.52, p= 0.016,η2p = 0.18, indicated a generally higher repe-
tition rate in Experiment 1b. Finally, the interaction of both factors
approached significance, F(1, 29)= 3.48, p= 0.072, η2p = 0.11,
suggesting a larger effect of trial-type in Experiment 1b than in
Experiment 1a.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend
previous findings of immediate action-effect binding and its
impact on subsequent free response choices (Dutzi and Hom-
mel, 2009). To this end, a free-choice response (Experiment 1a)
or a forced-choice response (Experiment 1b) produced an audi-
tory action-effect. Shortly after this action-effect, a second tone
prompted a free-choice response. This tone was either the pre-
vious action-effect or another tone. As predicted, tone repeti-
tions biased participants to repeat the previous response. For
Experiment 1a (free-choice), mean repetition rates were in the
range reported earlier by Dutzi and Hommel (2009). For Exper-
iment 1b (forced-choice), overall repetition rates were higher
and – at least numerically – the bias was even larger than in
Experiment 1a. Therefore, and because of the between-subject
manipulation in Experiment 1, we conducted Experiment 2
where both, free- and forced-choice responses were implemented
within-subjects.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, we replicated the response-repetition bias
reported by Dutzi and Hommel (2009), when participants per-
formed their first response in a free-choice task. More importantly,
we found the same pattern when this response resulted from
a forced-choice situation. This indicates that short-term action-
effect binding takes also place in this situation and is not restricted
to free-choice actions. Somewhat unexpected, this bias was numer-
ically even larger for the forced- compared to the free-choice
situation. In Experiment 2 we strived to replicate this finding using
a within-subjects design.
METHOD
Twelve new participants from the city of Würzburg (mean
age= 25.0 years; 8 females) performed in this experiment. Pro-
cedural details were as in Experiment 1 with one exception: all
participants performed in both, the free- and the forced-choice
variant. Accordingly, task (free-choice vs. forced-choice) was intro-
duced as a second repeated measure. The order of these tasks was
counterbalanced across participants.
RESULTS
In the free-choice part, 1.0% of the go trials were excluded because
of late responses. In the forced-choice part, trials with errors
in response to Stimulus 1 were excluded (1.8%) as well as late
responses to Stimulus 2 (2.0%). Participants chose both keys about
equally often for Response 1 in the free-choice task [each 50.0%,
χ2(1)< 0.01, p= 0.967]. Mean response-repetitions in correct tri-
als were submitted to an ANOVA with trial-type (congruent vs.
incongruent) and task (free-choice vs. forced-choice) as repeated
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measures. Results are illustrated in Figure 2 (right panel). Erro-
neous responses in no-go trials were given in 5.6 and 2.3% of the
trials in the free- and forced-choice task, respectively.
Response-repetitions were again significantly more likely for
congruent than for incongruent trials, F(1, 11)= 10.15, p= 0.009,
η2p = 0.48. Importantly, this main effect was qualified by the signif-
icant interaction of trial-type and task, F(1, 11)= 8.72, p= 0.013,
η2p = 0.44. The main effect of task was not significant, F(1,
11)= 0.02, p= 0.880,η2p < 0.01. One-tailed t -tests showed signifi-
cantly more repetitions in congruent trials for both, the free-choice
task, t (11)= 1.99, p= 0.036, d = 0.81, and the forced-choice task,
t (11)= 3.92, p= 0.001, d = 1.60. Additionally, the size of these
biases was strongly correlated across participants, r(12)= 0.75,
p= 0.005.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 replicated the pattern already observed
in Experiment 1. A reliable response-repetition bias emerged for
congruent trials for both tasks, and was again larger in the forced-
choice task than in the free-choice task. Thus, again short-term
action-effect associations were observed for both, free- and forced-
choice actions. The positive correlation of the biases also indicates
that the associations are built up to a similar degree not only on
the group level, but also on the level of the individual.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study we investigated whether stimulus- and goal-
driven actions differ with regard to short-term action-effect asso-
ciations. In general, there is good evidence that stimuli and their
corresponding responses are integrated into event-files (Hommel,
1998; Hommel et al., 2001). Similar integrations have previously
been shown for the effects of goal-driven (free-choice) actions
(Dutzi and Hommel,2009),but only indirectly for stimulus-driven
actions (Hommel, 2005, Experiment 2).
In the two present experiments, participants performed one
of two manual responses, either as determined by an imperative
stimulus (forced-choice task; stimulus-driven actions) or freely
chosen by the participant (free-choice task; goal-driven actions).
Each response randomly triggered one of two tones as an action-
effect. Briefly thereafter, the same, the other, or no tone was played.
In case of a second tone, participants freely chose between both
responses again. Participants tended to repeat the first response
more often when the effect tone was repeated to signal the (sec-
ond) response than when it was not. Thus, short-term action-effect
associations, i.e., the integration of actions and their effects into an
event-file (Hommel, 1998), were evident in our experiments. Cru-
cially, this was true for both,goal-driven, free-choice actions (Dutzi
and Hommel, 2009) and stimulus-driven, forced-choice actions.
Indeed, the observed bias was even larger for the stimulus-based
actions.
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM ACTION-EFFECT ASSOCIATIONS
These results suggest that actions and their effects are integrated
regardless of whether the action is classified as stimulus- or goal-
driven. Herwig and Waszak (2012) tackled a similar question with
a slightly different experimental approach. They also employed
two responses in each trial with the first response being either
free- or forced-choice. Again, this response produced an action-
effect and a second stimulus prompted the second response. This
second stimulus could share features with the previous effect or
not. In contrast to the present setup, however, the second response
was forced-choice throughout. Accordingly, RTs and percentage
errors were analyzed instead of repetition rates. Still, their results
mostly converge with the present findings. However, in contrast
to the present results, Herwig and Waszak did not find any hints
toward a larger bias for forced-choice actions and they accordingly
conclude that short-term binding results equally for free- as well
as forced-choice actions.
In light of these differences, we are cautious about drawing defi-
nite conclusions from the observed differences between the present
free- and forced-choice tasks in terms of stronger binding for
forced-choice actions. Instead, passing control to the environment
in a forced-choice task might simply have rendered the partici-
pants more susceptible for other environmental influences such as
response tendencies invoked by the perception of previous action-
effects. Thus, the more pronounced effects for the present forced-
choice tasks need not necessarily imply a genuinely stronger bind-
ing. Additionally, this case required continuous task switches from
forced- to free-choices and back. This may have increased attention
to task-related stimuli and might have led to a stronger effect in the
forced-choice condition, too. Regardless of this interesting differ-
ence, these results converge in the notion that short-term action-
effect associations are built for both, stimulus- and goal-driven
actions. Thus, on this level there is little reason for the assumption
of profound and qualitative differences between these actions.
However, our data do not speak toward differences in long-
term associations. Colzato et al. (2006) preferred the interpretation
that short-term and long-term associations are not necessarily
dependent on each other, although the existence of stable long-
term memory representations appears to affect the time-course of
short-term associations over a series of trials. Herwig and Waszak,
2012, Experiment 3) complemented their approach by testing
additionally for long-term associations that may have evolved
from an acquisition phase, where their participants showed reli-
able short-term associations. In line with their previous findings
(Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Herwig and
Horstmann, 2011), a reliable long-term association of actions and
corresponding effects was only found for those participants who
performed the free-choice version of their acquisition task. Her-
wig and Waszak (2012) suggest that redundant information might
be represented less and less strongly during repeated occurrences,
and eventually is thus not integrated into long-term associations.
Thus, in the case of forced-choice actions, action-effects are more
and more identified as redundant; consequently their representa-
tion should diminish and eventually do not leave a long-term trace.
Herwig and Waszak also suggest that such additional assumptions
can explain the results of Wolfensteller and Ruge (2011). The lat-
ter authors observed reliable “long-term” associations after only
a few forced-choice acquisition trials. According to Herwig’s and
Waszak’s reasoning then, the brevity of the acquisition phases sim-
ply may not have allowed to firmly identifying the redundancy of
the effects. As a consequence, they were still well represented and
integrated with the responses – as became evident in their test
phases.
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Nevertheless, this hypothesis cannot explain the whole range
of findings. It is difficult to see why free-choice test phases reliably
reveal long-term action-effect associations, even when acquired
during a long acquisition phase (Kühn et al., 2009, Experiment 3;
Pfister et al., 2011). Furthermore, it cannot explain why slight vari-
ations of the experimental design (e.g., including more response
alternatives) do yield reliable effects also for purely forced-choice
settings (Hommel, 1996; Elsner and Hommel, 2004).
A different perspective that might account for these findings
is based on the intentional weighting of feature codes (Hom-
mel, 1996). According to this view, any feature code that covaries
with the response is represented automatically. Intentional con-
trol over the available codes is possible by assigning different
weights to the represented features. This account is in line with
a variety of findings relating to perception and action (Memelink
and Hommel, in press). The absence of experimental evidence
for action-effect associations in forced-choice test phases follow-
ing prolonged forced-choice acquisition phases (Herwig et al.,
2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009) might thus indicate that small
weights are assigned to the represented action-effects even though
an action-effect association does exist. This process might be sup-
ported by the fact that action-effects were explicitly rendered
task-irrelevant in these studies.
In this view, free-choice (i.e., goal-driven) actions simply
increase the tendency to use action-effects for action control by
assigning a stronger weight to the relevant codes (Pfister et al.,
2010, 2011). Furthermore, free response choices are not the only
way to increase the weight that is assigned to action-effects. Other
relevant factors might be instructions (Hommel, 1993), task-
relevance (Ansorge, 2002), or saliency of action-effects that are
relevant for the task at hand (e.g., Kunde et al., 2007, 2012; Janczyk
et al., 2012a,b). Most importantly, however, this account does
not assume qualitative differences between stimulus- and goal-
driven actions regarding the underlying learning mechanisms.
This implication is further supported by the present results which
suggest similar mechanisms to mediate short-term bindings for
both, stimulus- and goal-driven actions.
CONCLUSION
The present study investigated short-term associations between
actions and their following effects. More precisely, we addressed
the formation of such short-term bindings for stimulus-driven
(forced-choice) and goal-driven (free-choice) actions. Results
indicate that ensuing action-effects are readily associated to both
types of actions. On a broader scale, these findings are also in
line with the common definition of “actions” for which “goal-
directedness” is a key element, independent of the more or less
apparent cause/motivation of an action.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Mean RTs (ms) to Stimulus 2 from Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of Effect – Stimulus 2 relation.
Effect – S2 relation Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Free-choice Forced-choice Free-choice Forced-choice
Congruent 530 530 525 557
Incongruent 512 525 493 568
Note that task (free- vs. forced-choice) was varied between-subjects in Experiment 1 and thus refers to Experiment 1a and 1b, respectively. RTs are based on correct
trials only and RTs deviating from the respective cell mean by more than 3SDs were considered outliers.
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